We analyze the subgame-perfect equilibria of a game where two agents bargain in order to share the risk in their assets that will pay dividends once at some fixed date. The uncertainty about the size of the dividends is resolved gradually by the payment date and each agent has his own view about how the uncertainty will be resolved. As agents become less uncertain about the dividends, some contracts become unacceptable to some party to such an extent that at the payment date no trade is possible. The set of contracts is assumed to be rich enough to generate all the Pareto-optimal allocations. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium allocation, and it is Pareto-optimal. Immediate agreement is always an equilibrium outcome; under certain conditions, we further show that in equilibrium there cannot be a delay. In this model, the equilibrium shares depend on how the uncertainty is resolved, and an agent can lose when his opponent becomes more risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the conditions under which every Pareto-optimal and individually rational allocation is obtainable via some bargaining procedure as the unique equilibrium outcome.
Introduction
Consider two risk-averse agents who want to share the risk in their assets. Assets will pay dividends only once, at some fixed datet. As in Wilson (1968) , each agent has his own beliefs about the dividends, but no agent has any private information.
1 Which contract will these agents agree on, and when will they reach an agreement? What are the determinants of "bargaining power"? These are the questions we ask in this paper. One might find it obvious that, given a sufficiently rich set of contracts, the agents will immediately agree on a Pareto optimal contract. We will show that this is true -but there are some interesting details to it.
In this environment, any allocation feasible at the beginning remains feasible until the end, and the agents are indifferent about which date they agree on any given allocation. Thus, the set of payoffs does not shrink as time passes and there is no discounting to create impatience for agreement. Instead, as time passes, some uncertainty about the dividends is resolved, making some of the contracts individually irrational for some agent, given the agent's expectations about how events will proceed. This reduces the scope for insurance. (Eventually at datet agents lose all insurance opportunities; autarky is the only individually rational contract left.) This loss of contracting opportunities leads agents to agree early on.
One can imagine many bargaining problems where such lost contracting opportunities are the major costs of delay -not discounting by the agents or some material losses. For example, many wage contracts are negotiated before the current contract expires. Thus, until the current contract expires, a major part of the cost of delay is the lost insurance opportunities between the workers and the firm against fluctuations in the labor market. 2 Sometimes, agents may also hold incompatible beliefs about the size of the gains from trade and each agent's outside options. Our analysis here may be helpful in analyzing such problems.
The formulation closest to the one adopted here is that of Merlo and Wilson (1995) . The relation to the latter is discussed further in a Remark following the presentation of our model in Section 2.
Our efficiency and immediate-agreement results are as follows. Assuming that all Pareto-optimal allocations can be generated by contracts throughout the bargaining process, under any sequential bargaining procedure with immediately expiring offers, the following are true: There exists an equilibrium where agents reach an agreement immediately; any subgame-perfect equilibrium is payoff-equivalent to this equilibrium (Theorem 1); and the equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-optimal when the first 1 Under these conditions, assuming that a Pareto-optimal allocation rule is employed, Wilson (1968) characterizes the conditions under which the group can be represented by an expected-utility maximizer. 2 Another example: it is common in legal practice that the settlement is negotiated while parts of the case are litigated. As each decision is made in court, some uncertainty about the eventual payment by the defendant is resolved, making certain settlement agreements individually irrational for certain parties. (In wage bargaining, delaying agreement may also result in the costly delay of some decisions the parties might want to take after the agreement. In litigation, the legal fees are also very large.) offer is made (Theorem 2). Furthermore, except for the trivial case where autarky is initially Pareto-optimal, immediate agreement is the only equilibrium outcome, provided each agent can make an offer with positive probability throughout, and the recognition process is affiliated (Theorem 3).
These results clarify certain results in the bargaining literature. Excessive optimism is presented as an explanation for delays by many authors, such as Hicks (1932) , Landes (1971) , Posner (1974) , Farber and Bazerman (1989) , and Yildiz (2001) . They demonstrate that, if each agent has excessively high expectations about his prospects in case of a delay, then delay may be necessary in equilibrium. Here, under the condition that agents can generate all the Pareto-optimal allocations throughout, we show that immediate agreement is always an equilibrium outcome, and is in fact the only equilibrium outcome for generic cases. Therefore, the delay results from the authors' restrictions on the set of contracts. Moreover, in order to satisfy our condition, all we need is risk-sharing agreements about the dividends and side-bets on the events about which our agents have distinct beliefs. Therefore, their results are based particularly on their implicit assumption that side-bets are not feasible.
At the beginning of any given date, the continuation value of an agent is the sum of the rents he expects to extract when he makes offers in the future, plus his expected utility of consuming the dividend paid by his own asset. The value of the rents is determined by the way uncertainty is resolved. After a substantial resolution of uncertainty, a substantial group of the potential contracts become individually irrational, and thus not viable. Therefore, agents who make offers prior to such resolution of uncertainty extract substantial rents. For instance, in the canonical case analyzed in Section 5, revealing an informative signal at some time t rather than s is equivalent to transferring the gain from trade associated with this signal from the agent who makes an offer at s − 1 to the agent who makes an offer at t − 1.
Many axiomatic bargaining solutions have the property that, if an agent becomes more risk-averse, then he becomes worse off while his opponent becomes better off. The same property holds in the Rubinstein-Stahl model for the instantaneous risk-aversion. In our model, the impact of risk aversion is ambiguous. If the total wealth in society is risky, risk aversion of an agent may hurt his opponent. Hence, this property exhibited (and sometimes postulated) in axiomatic bargaining models is not confirmed here.
Finally, even though we allow our agents to hold different beliefs, this is not the main attribute of our model. In fact, the earlier versions of this paper assumed that the agents hold the same beliefs.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section we lay out our model. In Section 3, we present examples with delay and inefficiency. We present our main results in Section 4. In Section 5, we derive the solution in closed form for a canonical case; we illustrate our results, and discuss the effects of risk aversion. In Section 6, we present a monotonicity property of the equilibrium and characterize the allocations that can be the equilibrium outcome for some bargaining procedure. The appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.
Model
In this section we lay out our model. For some (possibly large)t ∈ N, we take T = {t ∈ N|0 ≤ t ≤t} to be the time space, where N denotes the set of all non-negative integers. At each date t ∈ T , a signal Y t becomes publicly observable and remains observable thereafter. Writing Y = (Y 0 , . . . , Yt) and Y t = (Y 0 , . . . , Y t ), we designate y ≡ {y s } s∈T and y t ≡ {y s } s≤t as the generic realizations of Y and Y t , respectively. We have one consumption good, which will be consumed at datet, and two agents, whose set will be denoted by N = {1, 2}. Each agent i has a strictly concave and strictly increasing Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u i : R → R. We write P i (·|y t ) for the beliefs of i at y t , and P i for his prior beliefs. We assume that P 1 and P 2 are equivalent. That is, they assign zero probability to the same events. (This assumption is made only to avoid the ambiguity in using certain terms, such as almost surely.) We write E i [·|y t ] and E i for the expectations with respect to P i (·|y t ) and P i , respectively. Given any i ∈ N, for some x i ∈ R, we take [x i , ∞) as the set of feasible consumption levels for agent i and write X i for the set of all (risky) consumption functions, i.e., the random variables
that are integrable with respect to P i . Each agent i ∈ N has an asset that pays only one dividend D i ∈ X i , which will be paid att. There is no market at which our agents can trade.
By an allocation, we mean any
Here, x i (y) denotes the consumption of agent i when the realization of Y is y. By a contract x[y t ] at a given y t , we simply mean the restriction of an allocation x to the set {y 0 |y 0 s = y s for all s ≤ t} of all continuations of y t . Clearly, an allocation x is the mutual extension of contracts x[y t ]. We write X [y t ] for the set of all contracts at y t and X for the set of all allocations. We take some C t [y t ] ⊆ X [y t ] as the set of feasible contracts at y t and write C t ⊆ X for the set of allocations generated by the contracts in C t [y t ]. (The set of feasible contracts may be strictly smaller due to some additional constraints.) We finally write C = (C 0 , . . . , Ct).
We will analyze the game G (C, ρ) in which the following is common knowledge: At each t, first the signal Y t is observed and an agent ρ t (y t ) ∈ N is recognized. Then, the recognized agent offers a contract x [y t ]. If the contract is accepted by the other agent, they sign the contract, yielding payoff
for each i; otherwise, the offer expires and they wait until the next date, except for datet, when the game ends and each i consumes D i (y). The process ρ ≡ (ρ 0 , . . . , ρt) is called the recognition process. We assume 3 that
at each t and y s . We call any full list p = {p i t (y s )} y s ,i,t of such probability assessments a bargaining procedure. We assume that ρ and D are independent and that p i t (y s ) depends only on the history {ρ t 0 (y 0 , . . . , y t 0 )} t 0 ≤s of recognized agents. The set of all such bargaining procedures is denoted by P.
Remark Merlo and Wilson (1995) develop a stochastic model of bargaining in which the pie and the proposer at any date are determined by a time-homogenous Markov process σ = (σ 0 , σ 1 , , . . . , σ t , . . .), the players have a common prior, and the future is discounted with some β ∈ (0, 1). If we also had the common-prior assumption, we could transform our model into theirs. 4 Note that differing priors do not cause a problem in defining a pie as in Merlo and Wilson (1995) . Nevertheless, differing priors do induce differing transition probabilities for σ. The latter disagreement in the beliefs is the major source of the delay when the side-bets are not allowed (see Yildiz, 2001 ). More importantly, even if we had a common prior, we could not satisfy the condition that Merlo and Wilson (1995) require for their payoff-uniqueness and immediate-agreement results. This is mainly because we do not have actual discounting. 5 Even with discounting, our general model does not satisfy their condition, which is intended to cope with the problems that arise in the infinite-horizon case. For these reasons, we directly construct our equilibrium in the Appendix. The construction is mathematically straightforward, but hopefully reveals our agents' primary considerations.
Optimality, side bets, risk-sharing agreements Given any y t , an allocationx is said to be Pareto-optimal at y t iff
for each allocation x ∈ X. That is, the (conditional) probability that we can improve both agents' expected utility at y t is zero. An allocation is said to be Pareto-optimal iff it is Pareto-optimal at the beginning. We say that C is Pareto-complete iff C t contains all Pareto-optimal allocations for each t ∈ T .
Our next lemma is familiar. It states that C is Pareto-complete whenever all risksharing agreements and side-bets are available. Let us consider some objective components of uncertainty separately, and write each Y t as (Y t ,Ȳ t ) where the agents have a common prior onỸ t , which contains information about some objective aspects of uncertainty. Likewise, we write each y as (ỹ,ȳ).
Proof. All the proofs are in the Appendix. 4 We would take all the sample paths y t as our states, let each yt be absorbing, and compute the transition probabilities using the common prior. We would then consider a super-game in which our game starts at different dates, making σ time-homogenous. The pie at any state y t would be
for some β ∈ (0, 1). 5 That is why our immediate agreement result requires more conditions. T hat is, Pareto-optimal contracts do not refer toỸ = (Y 0 , . . . ,Ỹt) ifỸ does not affect the dividends and if agents hold common beliefs aboutỸ . Put differently, so long as we can write contracts on all the events that are relevant for the dividends (so that they can share all the risk) or the events about which the agents have distinct beliefs (so that they can bet), we can generate all the Pareto-optimal contracts.
Examples of delay and inefficiency
Two properties of the bargaining procedures in this paper are essential: (i) they are sequential and (ii) the offers expire immediately. In addition, we assume that (iii) C is Pareto-complete. Under these conditions, we will show that all equilibria are equivalent to an equilibrium where players immediately agree on an allocation that is Paretooptimal when the first offer is made. We will further show that this is the only equilibrium outcome for generic cases. Now, we will demonstrate that these conditions are not superfluous.
Firstly, it is well known that, when the bargaining procedure is not sequential, there may be multiple equilibria. In that case, the equilibria in future subgames may depend on the play at the beginning, and this may cause a disagreement at the beginning.
Our next example demonstrates that, when C is not Pareto-complete, we may have delay and inefficiency in (the unique) equilibrium. In this example, we restrict our contracts to the sales contracts. A sales contract can be represented by the amounts of equity shares Agent 1 owns in the assets, and a consumption-good transfer from Agent 2 to Agent 1. 
for each i. 6 We assume that only sales contracts are feasible.
At date 2, each agent knows the true state, hence any trade will be just a transfer from some agent i to the other, which is not individually rational for i. Hence, if they have not agreed by date 2, they will not trade. Thus, Agent 1 will accept an offer at t = 1 iff it gives him at least the expected utility of consuming his own asset. Moreover, at t = 1, the optimal contracts are sales contracts where any agent's equity shares in two assets are the same. Hence, at t = 1, Agent 2 will offer the Pareto-optimal sales contract that gives Agent 1 his continuation value. The offer will be accepted. When Y 1 = 1, the asset 6 In order to make P 1 and P 2 equivalent, take
of 1 will pay 16 for sure, yielding expected utility of √ 16 = 4. Then, Agent 2 will offer 64/81 of each asset to Agent 1, yielding payoff vector
if Agent 1 consumes his own asset, his expected utility will be only √ 9/2 + √ 0/2 = 3/2. In that case, Agent 2 will offer 1/9 of each asset to Agent 1, yielding payoff vector ¡ 3/2, 3 √ 2 ¢ . At t = 0, Agent 1 is certain that Y 1 = 1 and he will get 4. Likewise, Agent 2 is certain that Y 1 = 2 and she will get 3 √ 2. But the best sales contract at t = 0 is no-trade, yielding expected payoff (4, 4) ¿ ¡ 3/2, 3 √ 2 ¢ . Therefore, they disagree at t = 0. Yielding payoff vector ¡ 4, 3 √ 2 ¢ , the equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient. If Agent 1 owned both assets when Y 1 = 1 and Agent 2 owned both assets when Y 1 = 2 (the sales contracts available at each t ∈ {1, 2}), the payoff vector would be (9/2, 9/2).
Note that there is no allocation generated by feasible contracts at t = 0 that Paretodominates the equilibrium allocation. Therefore, the inefficiency is not caused by delay. Recognizing that the Pareto-dominating contracts will be individually irrational when they become available, agents agree on a Pareto-dominated contract. Note also that, if C were Pareto-complete, the contract that gives the entire wealth to the agent i with Y 1 = i would be feasible at t = 0, and agents would agree on this contract at t = 0, illustrating how the side-bets would be used in equilibrium.
In this example, we have exploited the fact that the players have different priors. This is not essential. What is essential is that the set of contracts at t = 0 is Paretoincomplete. The following version of this example demonstrates this.
Example 1

7
(continued) Now, assume that the consumption-good transfers are not feasible, i.e., the re-allocation of the assets is the only feasible form of trade. Consider a new set of utility functions and dividends. Take u 1 (
, and take the dividend-matrix as
for some small ² > 0. Assume that the players agree that each cell is equally likely. Now, if Y 1 = 1, the initial allocation is already Pareto-optimal, hence there will be no trade at date 1. If Y 1 = 2, player 2 will offer to exchange the assets (so that player 1 owns all of asset 2 and player 2 owns all of asset 1), which will be accepted. At the beginning of date 1, the continuation values of players 1 and 2 are 4 and √ 4 + ² + √ 4 ∼ = 4, respectively. Now, when ² = 0, among the offers that will be accepted by player 2 at t = 0, the best offer for player 1 is to give 4/ ¡ 1 + √ 3 ¢ 2 of each asset to player 2, and keep the rest.
Under this agreement, player 2 gets 4 and player 1 gets only approximately 3.7128 < 4. Therefore, for small values of ², they will not agree at t = 0. The delay is inefficient, because the risk-averse agent bears some of the risk. Finally, our next example demonstrates that, if the offers lived longer, the equilibrium outcome might necessarily be inefficient.
Example 2 ( The offers live longer.) Take T = {0, 1}, and assume that the offers made at t = 0 expire at the end of date 1. Let ρ 0 = 1 so that Agent 1 makes the offer at 0. Given any offer x 6 = D of Agent 1, the best response of Agent 2 is to wait until date t = 1 and to accept the offer iff x 2 (y) ≥ D 2 (y). Hence, for any offer x, Agent 1 would consume min{x 1 , D 1 } and Agent 2 would consume max{x 2 , D 2 }. In that case, Agent 1 would offer x = D. Therefore, there is no trade in equilibrium.
Similarly, allowing the offers to live one period in Rubinstein's (1982) model, Avery and Zemsky (1994) show that the steady-state subgame-perfect equilibrium may be inefficient. In many situations some information may arrive before the offer expires. This adds an option value for waiting, and causes inefficiency. (In an earlier version of this paper, we show that, if C is Pareto-complete, and the offers live one period, the equilibrium allocation will be Pareto-optimal when the first offer expires, that is, conditional on the signal observed.)
Equilibrium
In this section we analyze the subgame-perfect equilibria of a game G(C, ρ) with Paretocomplete C. The first result establishes that the equilibrium payoff-vector is unique and can be obtained through an immediate agreement. We show further that immediate agreement is the only equilibrium outcome if there are some gains from trade and each agent is likely to make an offer throughout. Finally, we derive an equation determining an agent's equilibrium payoff in terms of the dividends and the sequence of expected rents.
As usual, a strategy of an agent is a complete contingent-plan that determines the offer the agent makes when he makes an offer, and whether he accepts or rejects an offer made by the other agent. We require an agent's offers at various y t of a given date t to be measurable. A strategy profile s is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (henceforth simply equilibrium) iff the strategies are best response to each other in each subgame.
Notation Given any distinct i, j ∈ N, any t, any y t , and any feasible payoff vector v at y t , we letx t [v, i; y t ] be the (almost surely) unique solution to the optimization problem
and
Define the process V = {V t } t∈T by the terminal value
and the difference equation
required at each i and y t−1 . Here, V i t (y t−1 ) will be the continuation value of an agent i at the beginning of t at y t−1 for any equilibrium. Hence, (1) states the fact that there will be no trade att, while (2) is given by backward induction. That is, given that players will get V t+1 (yTheorem 1 Let C be Pareto-complete. Then, the following strategy profile (denoted bȳ s) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of game G (C,ρ): at any y t , an agent j 6 = ρ t (y t ) accepts an offer
Moreover, for any subgame-perfect equilibrium of G (C,ρ), the vector of continuation values at the beginning of any date t with
That is, all equilibria are payoff equivalent. Moreover, in one of these equilibria, the agents reach an agreement at t = 0, so long as the space of feasible contracts is Pareto-complete, e.g., so long as all side-bets and all risk-sharing agreements are feasible. (Therefore, the delay results cited in the Introduction are based on the authors' exclusion of some of these contracts.)
In any equilibrium, by Theorem 1, when agents learn which of them is to make the first offer, the continuation values are m i (V 1 (y 0 ); y 0 ) and V j 1 (y 0 ) where ρ 0 (y 0 ) = i 6 = j. This is a Pareto-optimal expected-utility level (cf. Lemma 2.1 in the Appendix). Since the utility functions are strictly quasi-concave, it is uniquely obtained bŷ
Hence, the outcome is Pareto optimal at y 0 , when they learn which player makes the first offer. Before they learn y 0 , however, agents are uncertain of whicĥ
; ·] may hurt our risk-averse agents, causing some inefficiency. In order to avoid this ambiguity in measuring efficiency, we will state our efficiency result for the case that Y 0 is constant.
Theorem 2 Let C be Pareto-complete. Then, G(C, ρ) admits a unique equilibrium allocation, which is Pareto-optimal at y 0 . This allocation is Pareto-optimal at the beginning whenever Y 0 is constant.
We have seen in Example 1 that, when the space of contracts is Pareto-incomplete, some delay may be necessary for reaching an agreement. When the space of the contracts is Pareto complete, there exists a contract at t = 0 that imitates such delay, as the delayed equilibrium allocation is unique. Therefore, even though the unique equilibrium allocation is reachable via contracts at t = 0, it is not clear that these contracts are not simply imitating a delay. Theorem 2 implies that, typically, the contracts written in equilibrium are not equivalent to a delay. For, by the syndicate theory, Pareto-optimal contracts use the minimal information about the total wealth and the discrepancy between the agent's beliefs. When there is a common prior, they depend only on the sum D 1 +D 2 . Our next example clarifies this matter further and motivates our next theorem.
Example 3 For any large, even integert, let Y = (Y 0 . . . , Yt) be identically and independently distributed, each Y t taking values of 0 and 1 with equal probabilities. Take D = 4 (Yt, 1 − Y x i for each i so that there is no risk in the total t ) and set u i (x i ) = √ wealth. First, consider the bargaining procedure with alternating offers where Agent 1 makes offers at even dates. Att − 1, Agent 2 offers the riskless allocation (1, 3), which is accepted. This allocation is already Pareto-optimal. Hence, there are multiple equilibria yielding the same allocation: at each t <t − 1, the recognized agent offers the riskless allocation (1, 3) , and the other agent accepts this offer only at some t * ≤t − 1. Now consider the recognition process according to which Agent 1 makes an offer at t iff y t = 0. Note that p 1 t = p 2 t = 1/2 for each t. Under this procedure there is a unique equilibrium. Att − 1, if recognized, agents 1 and 2 will offer (3, 1) and (1, 3), respectively. The offer will be accepted. Hence, at the beginning oft − 1, the risky allocation that gives (3, 1) and (1, 3) with equal probabilities will prevail. Thus, att − 2, the recognized agent will offer the other agent his continuation value, ¡ 1 + √ 3 ¢ /2 and keep the rest, which is larger than
Therefore, a risky allocation prevails att − 2, too, yielding
with equal probabilities. Repeating this procedure, one can see that, at each date, a risky allocation prevails, leading agents to reach an agreement at the previous date, in which the randomly determined proposer gets a somewhat larger share. Therefore, there is a unique equilibrium, which yields immediate agreement. 8 Therefore, under this random recognition procedure, the immediate agreement is not merely an imitation of a delay, as delay is no longer a possible equilibrium outcome. This is generally true in our model. To state this formally, we first need a definition: The recognition process ρ is said to be affiliated iff, when an agent is recognized at a given date, he will be, if anything, more likely to be recognized in the future. Note that when ρ is independently distributed (in particular, when it is deterministic), it is affiliated. Theorem 3 Assume that ρ is affiliated. Let p be a bargaining procedure with p i t (ρ s ) ∈ (0, 1) throughout. If D is independent of Y 0 and not Pareto-optimal initially, then the unique equilibrium path-of-play is that at t = 0 the recognized agent i offers the contract x 0 [V 0 , i; φ] and the other agent accepts the offer.
The rationale behind Theorem 3 is as follows. When there are gains from trade, the recognized agent will get some positive rent at some history y t . Since either agent is likely to be recognized at t, at the previous date there is a need for insurance against the risk associated with the allocation of this rent. When only one of the agents can get a positive rent when he is recognized, he faces a risk of whether he will be recognized so that he will get the rent, a risk that can be shared. When both agents can get a positive rent when they are recognized, they face uncertainty about which agent will get the rent; and once again they would like to share the risk. In either case, there is a gain to be realized at t − 1, allocating a positive rent to the agent recognized at t − 1. Applying the same argument inductively, one can conclude that there are gains to be realized at 0, in which case delaying agreement will cause an inefficiency (when the first offer made), which cannot be an equilibrium outcome according to Theorem 2. That is, when there are gains from trade, a strictly stochastic bargaining procedure will generate a positive risk (and thus a positive cost of delaying agreement) throughout the game, rendering delay impossible as an equilibrium outcome.
This argument implicitly assumes that being recognized at t does not decrease an agent's continuation value at t + 1. If the recognition process were not affiliated, or if it were correlated with the dividends, then being recognized at some time t might have happened to decrease an agent's continuation value at t + 1 as much as the rent at t, making the agent indifferent towards being recognized at t. If this happened to be true for both agents, then there would be no need to reach an agreement at t − 1, and this might have caused a delay. To show that this is possible, in the next example we consider a non-affiliated recognition process.
where Z 2 and Z 3 are normal random variables with mean 0 and variances σ 2 ∈ (0, 1) and 1, respectively. Each Z t becomes observable at t. At dates 0 and 1, each player is recognized with probability 1/2, independently from the history. If a player is recognized at date 1, he will be recognized at date 2 only with probability
Since each i consumes D i at date 3, if recognized at date 2, player 1 will offer −Z 2 − 1/2 to player 2 and keep Z 2 + 1/2 for himself. (Here, −Z 2 − 1/2 is the certainty equivalent of D 2 at date 2.) Similarly, if recognized at date 2, player 2 will offer Z 2 − 1/2 to player 1 and keep −Z 2 + 1/2 for himself. Hence, if player 1 is recognized at date 1, the continuation value of player 2 at the beginning of date 2 will be
The values of π and σ 2 are chosen so that V 2 2 (1) = −1, i.e., for player 2, the certainty equivalent of his consumption at 2 is
In that case, if recognized at date 1, player 1 will offer 0 to player 2, who will accept, and each will consume 0. The same is true if player 2 is recognized. Hence, if they wait until date 1, each player will consume 0, which is Pareto-optimal. Therefore, there is an equilibrium in which the agreement is delayed until date 1.
Summary In our model the set of feasible outcomes does not necessarily shrink as time passes. Instead, revelation of some information makes certain contracts individually irrational for some parties, and therefore not viable to society as a whole, a phenomenon known as the Hirshleifer effect. This happens to such an extent that at datet the only individually rational allocation is D itself. This sets further restrictions on the set of viable allocations at the previous date, through Lemmas 2 and 3. The inductive application of this procedure gives us a unique (Pareto-optimal) level of utilities at the beginning of the game. Risk-aversion shows up at this stage and tells us that the contract must also be unique, and further requires that, generically, there is no delay in equilibrium.
Equilibrium payoffs and rents In any equilibrium, given any y t , an agent i ∈ N gets m i (V t+1 (y t ); y t ) if he is to make an offer at y t , and gets only V i t+1 (y t ) if he is not to make an offer at y t . Hence, the recognized agent
Together with D, these rents determine the equilibrium payoffs. Substituting (3) in (2), we obtain
for each t ∈ T . Equation (4) displays the determinants of bargaining power in this environment. It states that the continuation value of an agent is the sum of the rents he expects to extract in the future when he is recognized, plus his expected utility from consuming the dividend his own asset pays. These rents will be decoupled in our next section.
Equilibrium in a Canonical Case
In order to illustrate some of the basic ideas in this paper, we analyze the equilibrium in the following canonical case. We assume that our agents have a common prior and the credit constraints are not binding. i.e., the set of feasible consumption levels is R.
We take u i (x) = − exp(−α i x) for some α i > 0 for each i ∈ N. We let Y = {Y t : t ∈ T } be independently distributed where each Y t takes values in R 2 , E[Y t ] = 0 at every t > 0, and Y 0 ∈ R 2 is a constant. We take D = Y 0 + Y 1 + · · · + Yt so that as time passes agents learn the independent increments in the dividends. Finally, we take a purely deterministic bargaining procedure, and write T i (t) = {s ∈ T | ρ s = i, s ≥ t} for the set of all future dates at which agent i is to make an offer.
Notation
i is a function of (Y t+1 , . . . , Yt), it is stochastically independent of (Y 0 , . . . , Y t ), and hence
In Figure 1 , we plot the equilibrium contracts {x t } t∈T in terms of their certainty equivalents computed at date 0. In this figure, the vector of certainty equivalents of any given allocation x t of the form He now extracts all the rent of agreeing one day earlier. Hence, the vector of certainty equivalents for this contract is found by going horizontally until we reach the line lt −1 . Using this algorithm until we reach the line l 0 , we find the certainty equivalents of the contract signed at t = 0.
We compute that the equilibrium allocation at any date t ∈ T iŝ
where i, j ∈ N with i 6 = j. (One can easily check the validity of (6) by induction.) Note that the share of the social risk W −E[W |Y 0 , . . . , Y t ] borne by agent i at any optimal risksharing scheme is
. At any s ∈ T i (t), in order to insure himself against his individual risk Y j s+1 , agent j is offered to bear
that he would bear if they were to agree at the next date. Since the agent i makes an offer that can be rejected only by delaying the agreement until s + 1, he extracts the entire value M
¤ (α j ) of this transaction for agent j. This value is the certainty equivalent of the extra risk that agent j bears, minus the certainty equivalent of the risk that agent
Figure 1: The sequence of the equilibrium contracts in the space of certainty equivalents computed at t = 0. j avoids. Thus, (6) is read as: The consumption allocated to an agent at some t is the certainty equivalent of his own asset's dividend plus the optimal risk that he shares, minus the rents that he pays to the other agent when the other agent makes an offer (in the future), plus the rent that he extracts from the other agent when he makes an offer (in the future). Using (6), we compute 9 that
where
Given that they will share the risk optimally, the value of the increment Y 
. Therefore, G s is the gains from sharing the risk in Y s+1 optimally. Therefore, (7) states that, in CE terms, the consumption that our equilibrium allocates to agent i at date t consists of what he already owns and the sum of gains from (optimal) trade when he makes offers in the future. Equation (7) is similar to (4). Moreover, in CE space we have transferable utility, which allows us to decouple the gains from trade at each date from the rest of the problem.
Observations Firstly, being able to make an offer prior to an important informationrevelation strengthens the position of a bargainer. is approximately obtainable via a deterministic bargaining procedure as long as information arrives smoothly. Assume that Y 1 , . . . , Yt are identically distributed with variance σ 2 /t. Then, given any Pareto-optimal and individually rational allocation x ∈ X and any ² > 0, there exists at such that we can find a 9 By independence, CE
t any x. Substitute these equalities in (6).
deterministic bargaining procedure p that yields
]| and λ 1 + λ 2 > 0, we write n for the integer part of
. We consider the bargaining procedure p with p 
The impact of risk aversion
Many axiomatic bargaining solutions have the property that, if a bargainer gets more risk-averse, then he becomes worse off, while his opponent benefits from this. Examples of such bargaining solutions are Nash (1950), Mashler-Perles (1980) and Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) . Roth (1985) shows that Rubinstein's bargaining model has the same property if we consider "instantaneous risk-aversion." 10 We will now show that this property does not hold in our model, where the bargaining is driven by risk aversion itself.
In our model, risk-aversion of an agent may hurt or benefit his opponent. To see this, note that an increase in α j affects CE ¤ (α j ) decreases, which increases G s . On the other hand,
ecreases, which results in a decrease in G s . Either of these effects can be dominant: If D 1 +D 2 is constant, the latter is identically 0, hence, the risk aversion of j benefits i. If D j is a constant, the former is identically 0, thus an increase in α j renders CE ¤ (α j ) is the decrease in j's reservation value, which strengthens i's position in bargaining.
In order to demonstrate which effect is dominant in which cases, let Y s+1 be a bivariate normal random vector with variance-covariance matrix
. Substituting these equalities into (8) and differentiating with respect to α j , we find that G s (and hence
Here, an agent benefits from the risk aversion of his opponent when r is small enough, the case when the social cost of this risk-aversion is not significant. Moreover, the upper boundr increases with both α j /α i and σ j /σ i . An intuition for this observation comes from insurance: As an insured becomes more risk-averse, we expect the insurer to benefit. On the other hand, if the insurer is the one who becomes more risk-averse, we would not expect the other party -the insured-to benefit. As α j /α i and σ j /σ i increase, agent i becomes the insurer and benefits from the risk aversion of agent j. . When r >r, the social cost ∆M SOC of increased risk-aversion will be larger than its private cost ∆M 1 for agent 1, and agent 2 will be worse off.
CE(D) CE'(D)
Remark One can check that the certainty equivalent of an agent is decreasing with his own risk-aversion. But this hardly implies that he is in a weaker bargaining position, as the certainty equivalent of his consumption would still decrease even if his consumption had not changed at all. In comparing a player's equilibrium welfare-levels as his own risk-aversion changes, we clearly perform an interpersonal comparison between the two selves of the agent, each self having a different utility function. We can safely say that an agent gets worse off as he becomes more risk-averse, only if each self finds the agent's consumption worse under higher risk-aversion. Since the equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal, the more risk-averse self will find himself worse off only when his risk-aversion benefits his opponent.
Monotonicity and Obtainability
In this section, we present two results about the equilibrium. The first one is by Merlo and Wilson (1995) . It states that an agent cannot lose when he becomes more likely to make an offer in the future. This fact will help us in proving the second result. The second result states that any individually rational and Pareto optimal allocation is obtainable as an equilibrium outcome of some bargaining procedure iff "the first-mover advantage" is not too large, i.e., the uncertainty resolved at t = 1 is not substantial.
Given any p ∈ P, let us write U 0 (p) for the vector V 0 of equilibrium-continuation values at the beginning for game G(C, p) where C is Pareto-complete.
Theorem 4 (Merlo and Wilson, 1995)
Given any two bargaining procedures p,p ∈ P with p i t ≥p i t at each t ∈ T for some i ∈ N, we have
By (2), the proof of Merlo and Wilson (1995) can be extended to our model. They also provide an example, showing that this result cannot be extended to more than two agents. Yildiz (2001) shows that, if the agents had different beliefs about the recognition process, we would also need to assume that the recognition process is affiliated.
Given any (Pareto-optimal and individually rational 11 ) allocation x ∈ X, can we find a bargaining procedure p∈P that gives us x as its equilibrium allocation (of game G(C, p))? If such a bargaining procedure p exists, then we will say that x is obtainable (via p).
We will now answer this question. To this end, take any i ∈ N, and set P i = {p∈P|p Theorem 5 Let C be Pareto-complete. Every Pareto-optimal and individually-rational allocation is obtainable iff
¢ for some i 6 = j expresses that it is not the case that, for some agent, the worst outcome when he moves first is better than the best 11 That is,
Figure 3: Obtainable utility levels. The disagreement utilities are at the origin.
outcome when he does not, i.e., the first-mover advantage is not too large. Therefore, Theorem 5 can be read as: Every Pareto-optimal and individually-rational allocation is obtainable so long as the first-mover advantage is not too large. The first-mover advantage is large when a substantial part of uncertainty resolved at date t = 1. If this is the case, then many axiomatic bargaining solutions that select centrally located utility pairs, such as the Nash bargaining solution, will not be obtainable. When uncertainty is resolved smoothly, the first-mover advantage will be small, and therefore every Pareto-optimal and individually-rational allocation will be obtainable.
The proof is illustrated in Figure 3 . Given any i, since U 0 is continuous and P i is connected, U 0 (P i ) is a connected set with the end-points
, which we computed above. By Theorem 2, U 0 (P i ) is on the Pareto-frontier, hence it is the part of Pareto-frontier connecting these two end-points. Moreover, any bargaining procedure p ∈ P can be written as a convex combination of two such bargaining procedures p [1] ∈ P 1 and p [2] ∈ P 2 , where p [j] is the same as p after j is recognized at 0, but recognizes j at 0 with certainty. Then, by linearity, U 0 (P) is the convex hull of U 0 (P 1 ) ∪ U 0 (P 2 ), as shown in the figure. Since the agents are strictly risk averse, the Pareto-frontier is strictly concave, hence the set of Pareto-optimal payoff vectors in U 0 (P) is U 0 (P 1 ) ∪ U 0 (P 2 ). This set contains all the Pareto-optimal and individually rational payoff vectors if and
, the characterizing condition in our Theorem.
Concluding Remarks
Consider a two-person risk-sharing problem where the agents' beliefs may differ but there is no private information. Assuming that a Pareto-optimal sharing rule is employed, Wilson (1968) , in his seminal paper "The theory of syndicates", shows that the group can be represented by an expected-utility maximizer only if the agents hold the same beliefs or the sharing rule happens to be linear. Since there is a continuum of Paretooptimal and individually rational allocations, we would expect the agents to allocate the risk through negotiation.
In this paper, we develop a natural bargaining-model in the context of risk sharing, and show that the equilibrium allocation will be Pareto-optimal and that there will be no delay for generic cases, provided there is a sufficiently rich set of contracts to generate the Pareto-optimal allocations throughout the negotiation -an implicit assumption in Wilson (1968) . This result strengthens Wilson's theory by predicting its Paretooptimality assumption.
The allocation chosen by the group in equilibrium depends on the way uncertainty is to be resolved. For example, in Section 5, where the agents hold the same beliefs and the sharing rule is linear, revealing an informative signal at some time t rather than s is equivalent to transferring the gain from trade associated with this signal from the agent who makes an offer at s − 1 to the agent who makes an offer at t − 1. Since the decision of an expected utility maximizer is typically independent of such details, this suggests that we may not be able to find an expected-utility maximizer that represents the group even if the agents hold the same beliefs. This may strengthen Wilson's negative result.
Our detailed analysis also helps us to understand the role of risk aversion in bargaining better. Contrary to earlier results, in our model, the risk aversion of an agent may hurt the other agent, as the social cost of the agent's risk-aversion may exceed its private cost to the agent.
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A Proofs
This section contains the proofs. Throughout these proofs, we will use the fact that C is Pareto-complete iff, given any x ∈ X and any y t , there exists a feasible allocationx ∈ C t such that
Towards proving Lemma 1, write each P i asP ×P i , whereP is the common prior associated withỸ . Given any ¡ i, x i , y t ¢ , we define the conditional marginalsĒ i £
. Proof. (Lemma 1) Take any y t and any x ∈ X. Since
. . ,X ¢ is Pareto-complete. We now present two preliminary results used in our construction. Our first Lemma states some familiar properties of optimization with increasing functions.
Lemma 2 Let C be Pareto-complete. Given any distinct i, j ∈ N, any t, any y t , and any
has an (almost surely) unique solutionx t [v, i; y t ], which does not depend on C.
for the maximum. Then, the following are true. 
where the inequality is strict whenever z is not Pareto-optimal at y t .
Proof. Since ¡ u 1 , u 2 ¢ is increasing, the optimization problem (10) corresponds to the optimization problem max w∈Ũ(Ct;y t )
in the utility space whereŨ(C t ;
Firstly,Ũ(C t ; y t ) =Ũ(X; y t ) for each C t , 12 hence, if exists, the solution m i ¡ v; y t ¢ to (11) does not depend on
|x ∈ X} is compact. 13 Hence, a solution m i ¡ v; y t ¢ to (11) (and thus a solutionx t [v, i; y t ] to (10)) exist. 12 To see this, take any w ∈Ũ(X;
showing that w ∈Ũ(C t ; y t ). Therefore,Ũ(X; y t ) ⊆Ũ(C t ; y t ).
On the other hand, C t ⊆ X, thusŨ(C t ; y t ) ⊆Ũ(X; y t ). Therefore,Ũ(C t ; y t ) =Ũ(X; y t ). 13 Since u 1 and u 2 are continuous and
As we will see,x t [v, i; y t ] is Pareto optimal at y t , hencex t [v, i; y t ] is unique (almost surely), and is in C t £ y t ¤ . In the following, without loss of generality, we will take C t = X. 
, which is a contradiction. Therefore,x t [v, i; y t ] is Pareto-optimal at y t . Part 2 of the lemma can be proven by similar arguments to the last one. As for Part 3, since z ∈ X, m i (v; y t ) ≥ v i . Moreover, sincex t [v, i; y t ] is Pareto-optimal at y t and
if m i (v; y t ) = v i , then z will be Pareto-optimal at y t , showing the contrapositive of the last statement. Given any two dates t, s ∈ T with t ≤ s, consider a collection {x[y s ]} y s of contracts at s, indexed by the continuation y s of y t until s. Write x|y t for the mutual extension of these contracts. At each y s , x|y t requires agents to write x[y s ]. We call x|y t preemptive, for x|y t is equivalent to offering the continuation in advance to preempt the delay. Our next Lemma states that x|y t will be a contract at y t in all cases of concern.
Lemma 3 Take any t ∈ T , and let 
Hence, we only need to guarantee thatx k is integrable for each k ∈ N. Now, by Lemma 2.1,x[y s ] is Pareto-optimal. Thus, by the syndicate theory, there exists some λ 0 > 0 such that the equations x(y;λ) = arg max
(at each continuation y of y s ) and
hold when λ = λ 0 . We setx(y) =x(y;λ 0 ). [We choosex(y;λ) to satisfy Equation (12) at each y rather than almost surely. Hence the phrase "we can choose" in the statement of Lemma.] Clearly,x(y;λ) is continuous in λ. Hence, so is Φ. Thus, λ 0 that solves equation (13) is upper semi-continuous in
is measurable, we conclude thatx is measurable. Moreover,x k ≤ D 1 + D 2 − x l ∈ X k for l ∈ N\ {k} and hence E k £¯x k¯¤ ≤¯x k¯+ E k £¯D 1 + D 2 − x l¯¤ < ∞; and this completes the proof.
Construction of an Equilibrium
For a given G(C, ρ) with Pareto-complete C, we now construct the subgame-perfect equilibriums of Theorem 1. In this equilibrium, the agents reach an agreement immediately. We use backward induction. If the agents have not agreed byt, att, agent j 6 = ρt (y) will accept an offer x (y) iff x j (y) ≥ D j (y). This inequality holds only when x k (y) ≤ D k (y) for k = ρt (y). Hence, k will offer xt (y) = D (y). There will be no trade. Each will consume his own asset, independent of which contracts were offered at previous dates. The continuation value of an agent i at the beginning oft will be
Given any date t <t, assume that an allocation x t+1 ∈ X will prevail at date t+1, independent of which contracts were offered (and rejected) before.
¢ |y t ¤ for the continuation value of any agent i at the beginning of t + 1. Given that agent j 6 = ρ t ¡ y t ¢ gets V j t+1 (y t ) when he rejects an offer x t [y t ], it is a best response for him to accept
, and V k t+1 (y t ) otherwise. To maximize this expected utility level, he will either offer x t [V t+1 (y t ), k; y t ], the best acceptable offer, and get m k ¡ V t+1 (y t ); y t ¢ , or will offer some unacceptable offer and get
, and the offer is accepted. Since x t+1 ∈ X, by Lemma 3, we can choose contractsx t [V t+1 (y t ), k; y t ] at all sample paths y t in such a way that their mutual extension forms an allocation, yielding a (preemptive) contractx t [V t+1 , k; ·]|y t−1 at y t−1 . We choose them so. If agents do not reach an agreement by date t, allocationx t [V t+1 , ρ t ; ·] (which isx t [V t+1 , i; ·]|y t−1 when ρ t ¡ y t ¢ = i andx t [V t+1 , j; ·]|y t−1 when ρ t ¡ y t ¢ = j) prevails at t. This allocation is once again independent of which contracts were offered previously. Since
, the continuation value of an agent i at the beginning of t is
at each y t−1 . By backward induction, this procedure gives uss as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of G(C, ρ). Proof. (Theorem 1) We have already shown thats is an equilibrium. Now, given any equilibrium s * , we will show (via mathematical induction) that the vector of continuation values at the beginning of any t is V t . This is trivially true att. Assume that it is true at some t + 1. Since s * is an equilibrium, an agent j must accept an offer
. Thus, j's action in s * can differ from his action in s only by rejecting an offer
. The only such distinction that can make a difference is when j rejectsx t [V t+1 (y t ), i; y t ]. Let us consider this case. If V t+1 is not Pareto-optimal at y t , then by Lemma 2.3, m i (V t+1 (y t ); y t ) > V i t+1 (y t ) where i = ρ t ¡ y t ¢ . Sincex t [V t+1 (y t ), i; y t ] is rejected, the best response correspondence of i at y t is empty. This contradicts the fact that s * is an equilibrium. Therefore, when V t+1 is not Pareto-optimal at y t ,x t [V t+1 (y t ), i; y t ] must be accepted, and hence s * ands yield the same outcome at y t . On the other hand, when V t+1 is already Pareto-optimal at y t , m i (V t+1 (y t ); y t ) > V i t+1 (y t ). Hence, if j is to rejectx t [V t+1 (y t ), i; y t ], the best response of i is to make an offer that is to be rejected, yielding m i (V t+1 (y t ); y t ) for i and V j t+1 (y t ) for j -as ins. Therefore, in either case, s * and s yield the same continuation values at y t (after the agent is recognized). Therefore, at the beginning of t, they yield the same vector of continuation values, which is V t ¡ y t−1 ¢ . We now prove Theorem 3. Using the notation of Lemma 1, we takeỸ = ρ, and write each y t as ¡ ρ t ,ȳ t ¢ and each y as (ρ,ȳ), where ρ t is the history of the recognized agents. (Ȳ consists of all the information except for the recognition process.) The recognition process and the dividends are stochastically independent, hence D ∈ X, i.e., D (ρ,ȳ) = D (ρ 0 ,ȳ) for each (ρ, ρ 0 ,ȳ). The allocations generated by contracts below will all be inX, hence the irrelevant argument ρ will be omitted. We first prove the following Lemma.
Proof. We will prove the contrapositive. That is, assuming that
for some j, k ∈ N, we will show that
Since there are no rents at t, our assumption holds only for t ≤t − 1. Considering any such t with (14), we take l 6 = k. We take y t and its continuations y 
at each continuation (ρ,ȳ) of y t . By concavity, we have
is not a Pareto-optimal utility pair at y t , thus by Lemma 2.3, Proof. (Theorem 3) Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which agents do not agree at some history y 0 . Then, by Theorem 2, V 1 (y 0 ) is a Pareto-optimal utility level, thus R ρ 0 (y 0 ) 0 = 0. Thus, by the previous Lemma, for each j, k ∈ N, and each s > 0, P j ¡ R k s (y s ) 1 {ρ s =k} = 0|y 0 ¢ = 1, yielding E j £ R k s 1 {ρ s =k} |y 0 ¤ = 0. Therefore, by (4), V 1 (y 0 ) = (E 1 [u 1 (D 1 )|y 0 ], E 2 [u 2 (D 2 )|y 0 ]), showing that D 1 is Pareto-optimal at y 0 . Since D is independent of Y 0 it must also be Pareto-optimal at the beginning -a contradiction.
We will now prove Theorem 5. To this end, given any set S ⊂ R 2 , let us write Hull[S] for the convex hull of S, the smallest convex set that includes S. Note that Hull[U 0 (P 1 ∪ P 2 )] = {λU 0 (p [1] 
Lemma 5 U 0 (P) = Hull[U 0 (P 1 ∪ P 2 )].
Proof. Given any p∈P, starting at history h 0,1 , the subgame of G(C, p) that starts at some y 0 before the recognized agent makes his offer coincides with that of and G(C, p The payoff vectors from Pareto-optimal allocations form a connected curve P F in R 2 , which we call the Pareto-frontier. Given any two v,v ∈ P F , we write [v,v] P F = {v ∈ P F | min{v 1 ,v 1 } ≤ v 1 ≤ max{v 1 ,v 1 }} for the part of the Pareto-frontier connecting v tov.
Since U 0 is continuous and P i is connected, U 0 (P i ) is also connected. But, by Theorem 2, we have U 0 (P i ) ⊆ P F . Thus,
Using Lemma 5, we obtain the following lemma.
Proof. We have U 0 (P) ∩ P F = Hull[U 0 (P 1 ∪ P 2 )] ∩ P F = U 0 (P 1 ∪ P 2 ), where the first equality is due to Lemma 5, and the second equality is due to the fact that we have strictly concave utility functions yielding strictly convex set U[X] of materially-feasible utility levels. By (15), we further have
Proof. (Theorem 5) (See Figure 3 for illustration.) Firstly, the set of all Pareto-optimal and individually rational utility levels is [U 0 (p [1] ), U 0 (p [2] )] P F . Thus, Every Pareto-optimal and individually-rational allocation is obtainable iff [U 0 (p [1] ), U 0 (p [2] )] P F ⊆ U 0 (P). This inclusion holds iff U 0 (P 1 )∩U 0 (P 2 ) 6 = ∅. [If U 0 (P 1 )∩U 0 (P 2 ) 6 = ∅, then by Lemma 8 we have U 0 (P)∩P F = U 0 (P 1 ) ∪ U 0 (P 2 ) = [U 0 (p [1] ), U 0 (p [2] )] P F . Conversely, when U 0 (P 1 ) ∩ U 0 (P 2 ) = ∅, by Lemma 8, [U 0 (p [1] ), U 0 (p [2] )] P F \U 0 (P) = [U 0 (p [1] 
, and this inequality holds iff U 2 0 (p [2] ) ≤ U 2 0 (p [1] ).
